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SEYMOUR

S.

BERNFELD *

Developing the Resources of the SeaSecurity of Investment**
After the past year or so of almost frenzied symposia attention
to the subject, we can safely start our discussion of the development
of the resources of the sea with the postfilates that: (i) Everyone
is aware of the basic principle of the freedom of the seas;' (ii) the
food resources of the seas, as a source of proteins, are far more vital
to the very existence of man than the world of Grotius could appreciate;' (iii) such resources are finite, exhaustible, and in danger of
extinction unless an orderly universal system of conservation is quickly
effected;' (iv) man's industrial pollution of his rivers and the sea
endanger those resources; 4 (v) the waters of the seas have become
Member of the New York Bar. LLB, Fordham University.
** An address delivered at the joint meeting of August 8, 1967 of the
International and Comparative Law and Mineral and Natural Resources Law
Sections of the American Bar Association on the occasion of the Association's
annual meeting at Honolulu, Hawaii.
1 A succinct statement of it is credited to Queen Elizabeth in disposing of
the Spanish ambassador's complaint on the depradations by Sir Francis Drake
on the Spanish treasure fleet: ". . . the use of the sea and the air is common to
all; neither can a title to the ocean belong to any people or private persons for
as much as neither nature nor public use or custom permitted any possession
thereof." Camden, History of England (1580).
2See N.Y. Times: January 23, 1967, p. 38, col. 1; January 31, 1967, p. 19,
col. 3; April 10, 1967, p. 51, col. 8.
3 See preamble to Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54, 52 AJIL 851;
Garcia, Introduction, pp. 1-3, The Exploitation and Conservation of the
Resources of the Sea (1959).
4 MNRL 26.
*
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necessary as a source of potable water in parched areas;' (vi) the
mineral wealth within and under the Great Seas of Mankind is of
great variety and almost immeasurable in quantity; (vii) within the
next decade or two at the most, man will devise economically feasible
methods for the recovery of that wealth from depths substantially in
excess of 200 meters; (viii) those methods will be achieved only after
an intensive and extremely expensive period of theoretical research
and physical experimentation; and (ix) participants in the activity
will be of varied nationalities serving under many flags.'
I use "mineral" in its widest sense, including in the term not
only oil and gas in the subsoil beneath the waters, manganese nodules
and other concretions covering miles of the sea floor, but the hard
rock minerals beneath that floor and the minerals to be extracted from
the waters of the seas as well. By the "Great Seas of Mankind" I
include the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans after excluding from each of them those bodies of water sui generis such as
closed or partially enclosed seas, bays, estuaries, straits, channels,
and the like. Excluded too are collateral vexations such as the effect
of colonial islands and volcanic evulsions upon the regime of the
waters, bed, and subsoil of those seas.
Is the principle of the freedom of the seas enunciated in Grotius'
tract of 1604, as amended since that time,8 still valid and adequate
in the light of today's needs? Have the Geneva Conventions of 1958
provided the reinterpretation of that principle needed to fit today's
needs?
Necessity is not only the mother of invention but the sire of
all law.' Thenecessities uf the 16th century which required the basic
, "Research in The Sea," Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, pp. 28, 29;
Fye, "The Economic Potential of the Oceans" (1966), presented at Harvard
Business School Symposium on International Investment; Wright, "The Coming
Water Famine" (1966); "Saline Water Conversion Report" (1965), U.S. Dept.
of Interior, pp. iii-viii.
6 "The Ocean's Resources," International Science and Technology (April,

1967), pp. 36-38; Mero, "The Mineral Resources of the Sea" (1956); "Undersea
Mining," a series of articles in Engineering and Mining Journal, May-August,
1965.
7 Mare Liberum, really written as a part of his larger work on the law
of
prize, De Jure Praedae.
8 I.e.,

the concepts of the territorial sea and the contiguous police zone.
9"The progressive development of international law, which takes place
against the background of established rules, must often result in the modification
of those rules by reference to new interests or needs." Commentary (1) by the
International Law Commission on Article 71. ILC Yearbook, 1956, Vol. II,
p. 299.
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principle were only three-the need of the sea for international trade
and communication, the need for the then inexhaustible and selfreplenishing food resources of the sea, and the need for a defensive
barrier against surprise invasion from seaward. The first two were
the bases for the universal principle, the last the basis for the first limitation on the general rule, the territorial sea.
We have since found that the territorial sea does not constitute
a sufficient protection against smuggling, epidemic, and fiscal evasions
and have, first by treaties,'" and then by United Nations convention,"
provided a contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea for exercise of
the necessary preventative police powers. Missile development has
largely negated the value of the sea and distance alone as a defensive
barrier.
The inexhaustibility of the marine food supply has been scientifically disproved. International trade and communication is no
longer absolutely dependent upon the sea, except for huge bulk shipments, a great portion of the burden having been assumed by air
transport, radio, and cable facilities.
The inadequacies of the 17th century principle have been recognized for over a century and many international meetings during that
time have been convened in an attempt to update the basic principle.12
The Geneva Conventions of 1958 " constitute the grandest and most
comprehensive effort of all, an attempt to do by universal enactment
what was impossible of accomplishment by local or individual treaties.
But, have those conventions created universally obligatory rules of
law, or do they constitute no more than contracts among the signatory
numerical minority of all of the nations of the world expected to be
bound by them? ",
10

E.g., Great Britain and the United States of America, January 23, 1924

(U.S. Treaty Series, No. 685).
11 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958), see n. 13,
infra.
12 Beginning with the Congress of Paris in 1856 following the Crimean war.
13 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, UN Doc. A/Conf.
13 L. 52, 52 AJIL (1958) 834 et seq.; Convention on the High Seas, UN Doc.
A/Conf. 12 L. 53, 52 AJIL (1958) 842 et seq.; Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, UN Doc. A/Conf.
13 L. 54, 52 AJIL (1958) 851 et seq.; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
UN Doc. A/Conf. 13 L. 55, 52 AJIL (1958) 858 et seq.
14 Kunz, "The Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and
Abuse," 50 AJIL (1956) 828 et seq.; Jessup, "Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea, A Study in International Law Making," 52 AJIL (1958) 730,
732.
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My primary preoccupation here will be with the exploitation of
the mineral resources of the Great Seas and the adequacy of the
legal climate provided by the existing law of the sea, including the
conventions of 1958, to warrant the huge financial commitments
required to engage in such exploitation. Does the basic security required by entrepreneurs and banking consortiums exist? Is there
security of title, security of possession, security of capital, and security
of earned return? Is there an effective regime to provide that security?
Until the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1 there was no formal international recognition of the
right of any nation to mine from the bed and subsoil of its own territorial seas though a number had been doing it for a long period of
years, some by tunnel from the shore and others by dredge or similar
method.' 6 It is fair to say that the Truman proclamation of 1945 on
the continental shelf 17 was the first formal declaration by one nation
to all nations of that right and of the theory that a nation's sovereignty
extended, not only to its land mass above the waters of the sea, but
to the extension of that mass beneath the sea to the point at which
the previously gentle slope of the seabed pitched to the Great Deeps
at a more acute angle 1 8-and that without regard to the limits of
the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of purely defensive police
concern.
The 1945 proclamation was soon followed by the claims of a
number of South American nations to a 200-mile-wide territorial
sea to counterbalance the regrettable fact that nature had endowed
them with no continental shelf, instead pitching their land mass
abruptly to the Great Deeps. 9 The notion of territorial sea and
an asserted sovereignty over all and any part of it-waters, bed, subsoil, and all of the natural resources within them-became confused
and intermingled with the concepts of the contiguous zone and the
continental shelf.
The International Law Commission,2" delegated the task of drafting and recommending to the United Nations an updated universal
code of the sea, 2' set the stage for the United Nations Conference
15

N.

13, supra.

16 Mero, op. cit., pp. 16, 17, 96, 97, 98.
17 Proclamation No. 2667 (10 F.R. 12303), Sept. 28, 1945.
18 Credit is given to the Spanish oceanographer, Odon de Buen, for originating
the theory in 1918-Garcia, p. 70.
19 MNRL p. 241.
20 General Assembly Res. 174 (II) 4 Nov. 1947.
21 General Assembly, Off. Docs,
11th Sess. (1956), Supp. No. 9 (A/3159).
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 1

Developing the Resources of the Sea

/71

on the Law of the Sea 22 which produced, among others, the convention most involved in the development of the mineral2 resources
of the high seas-the convention on the Continental Shelf. 1
The general effect of the 1958 Conventions is to divide the
seas into five vertical bands, viz., internal waters, the territorial sea
of undefined width, the contiguous zone limited to twelve miles from
the shoreward beginning of the territorial sea, the high seas beginning
beyond the undefined territorial sea, and the continental shelf, a
part of the high seas. The Convention on the Continental Shelf adds
still another quirk, the horizontal banding and separation of the
seas into the bed and subsoil on the one hand and the waters above
them on the other;-2 a legal regime being provided for the former and
limbo assigned to the other.
The attempt of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea to provide the security necessary for exploitation under the
high seas resulted, unfortunately, in a legal fantasy having no relation
to the geological concept for which the Convention on the Continental
Shelf was named. 2 " By its definition, the term was used
as referring (a) to the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the sea
bed and subsoil2 6of similar submarine areas adjacent to the
coasts of islands.
The definition appears clear up to the point at which the adjacent
seas first reach 200 meters in depth, but what about the area between
that and the next point at which the depth is again found? 2' Is it
left in limbo? Which 200 meter depth is meant-the first or last
befbre we come to the median?
Note too, that "exploitation" and not "exploration" is the criterion for extension beyond the wandering or vague 200 meter line.
But exploitation can only follow exploration and expensive exploration needs security of rights and sanctions before funds will be made
available for the activity. The definition leaves the entrepreneur in
a peculiar position. He must prove the deposit before he can negotiate
--

Geneva, 24 February to 27 April 1958.

23

N.

13, supra.

Arts. 1 and 3 of that Convention.
25 Op. cit., n. 9, pp. 295-296.
26
Art. 1.
27 Comm. (8), op. cit., n. 9, p. 297.
24
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for a lease or concession! If he should explore the high seas at a
500 meter depth, no nation can say him "nay" if he does not interfere with navigation or cause pollution harmful to fish stocks, for
no nation may assume exclusive jurisdiction over any portion of the
high seas. By the same token, too, no nation can grant him an
exploration license which will provide him with meaningful rights
and protection during that exploration. He is entirely reliant on
his own willingness and ability to use force to repel force and he has
no effective court or like body to which he can turn for protection
except in the event of piracy.
When he finally does achieve exploitation of some portion of
the high seas, those seas are literally pulled from under him and
he finds himself, for the first time, within the jurisdiction of a sovereign
state with which, after first proving the deposit, he would then have
to "negotiate," a farcical result entirely beyond the bounds of business
sense.
In such a situation, the practical result would likely be that the
entrepreneur would ask his nation for protection and his nation,
depending upon the prevailing national philosophy, would either
defend its citizens' activities on the high seas, especially in view of
the ambiguity of the Conventions as to the limit of the territorial
sea, or would abandon him to the tender mercies and "sense of fairness" of the latter. No vivid imagination is necessary to visualize what
the latter situation would really produce.
What does the undefined term "exploitation" mean? Does it
mean merely physical recovery of a scoopful of manganese or other
nodules from the bed of the sea or does it mean recovery in commercial quantity at an economic cost, the sense in which any entrepreneur would consider the term? Will recovery from the seabed
of nodules from a 500 meter depth extend the Continental Shelf
for minerals beneath that bed at like depth, even if recovery of the
latter is not yet feasible? Will such exploitation extend every nation's
continental shelf to the new depth or only that of the nearest nation?
Our very first basic requirement, that is, creation of possessory
rights and sanctions for those rights during the exploration period,
is entirely missing beyond the 200 meter mark-wherever that might
be placed.
The objective of the Convention on the Continental Shelf was
to divide the beds of the seas among the coastal nations for that was
the real need if future conflicts were to be avoided. The CommenInternational Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 1
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taries of the International Law Commission on its provisions for
a continental shelf showed the same intent.s Why didn't the Conference do exactly that, unequivocally? Why toy with a confused
and unnecessary continental shelf concept at all? Instead, provide
that the beds of all of the Great Seas shall be deemed divided by a
median line through the longest dimension of each, and then run each
coastal nation's rights to the seabed to that median between the lines
of latitude and longitude, as the case might be, from that nation's
coastal extremities. The result would create the regimes necessary
to insure orderly exploration and exploitation. Security would be
a reality.
There would be, of course, a number of vexing and collateral
problems-such as the consideration to be given islands which constitute sovereignties and those which constitute dominions or only
colonies, and the effect of a long coastal chain of islands upon the
extent of claim, if any, of the inner coastal continental sovereignty
to the beds and subsoils of seas beyond those islands. These could
be reserved as regional problems for settlement among only those
directly affected. Enclosed or partially enclosed seas or local bays
abutting those seas could be similarly treated and the way has been
pointed here by the North Sea treaties. If the general principles
could be agreed upon, it would make vast areas of the Great Seas
ready now for exploration under sanction of law, and it would put
almost irresistible economic pressure upon those caught in the morass
of a regional problem to compose their differences as quickly as
possible so that they too might proceed to the business in hand and
the profit of the future.
The structure created by the Geneva Conventions of 1958, in
regard to mineral exploitation of the sea, is only a castle of sand.
No one knows where the territorial sea ends or where the high seas
and "continental shelf" begin.
Several other suggestions have been made by others for the
orderly disposition of exploration and mining rights on and under
the beds of the seas, for example:

21

1. The United Nations could auction or otherwise dispose of
blocks of the seabeds to qualified bidders, the United Nations reN. 25, supra.
9 Christy, "Alternative

28

Regimes for Minerals of the Sea Floor." paper

delivered at American B? r Association National Institute on Marine Resources
held at Los Angeles, California (1967).
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serving a royalty, rental, or other financial return and providing
sanctions in return. Or
2. The United Nations would, by drawing or some other equitable means, apportion the beds of the seas among the member
states who, in turn, would enact the necessary legislation to provide
security of title, rights, and sanctions. (We might wonder, parenthetically, what we could do in this respect with reference to nonmember nations as large and as heavily populated as Communist
China.) Or
3. The seas should be declared res nullius rather than res communes and the seas and their subsoils considered open for claim
staking and eventual title in the American or Canadian style.
In view of the current inability of the few members of the Common Market to agree on the political phase of that arrangement because each is so jealous of every little corner of its own sovereignty,
can we expect all or most members of the United Nations to agree
on the first alternative, that is, that the United Nations be empowered
to lease or otherwise dispose of mineral rights for its own direct
benefit? A host of political impracticalities hide in the concept."0
The system would provide funds and enforcement facilities sufficient
to make the United Nations a self-sufficient super-government capable
of effectively enforcing the majority will and it would, of course,
generate and continuously feed the inevitable squabble whenever a
substantial sum of money is concerned. Even if the United Nations
Secretariat were to be allowed to retain only enough to pay the cost
of administering the system or even the costs of the UN itself, the
ensuing cacophony among the family of nations over the division
of spoils would put to shame the heavenly philosophical chaos caused
among Anatole France's saints and angels. His venerable St. Mael,
in his nearsightedness, mistook a colony of Arctic penguins for frockcoated gentlemen and baptized them, an indiscretion requiring
heavenly resolution as to the effect of baptism on birds. The United
Nations is far from unanimity in sanction techniques. Witness the
financial debacle of the Congo peace operation and the still continuing
Mid-East crisis.
The third suggestion, adoption of the American system of claim
staking followed by a patent without reservation to the national government which grants it, would be a novel concept contrary to the immemorial custom of the rest of the world operating under a regalian
30 Comm. (9), op. cit., n. 9, p. 298.
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theory whereby minerals in the ground are the national patrimony
never to be alienated by the state, and minerals can become the
property of an individual only when severed from the ground pursuant
to license from the state guaranteeing a profit to the state. The United
States still patents mineral claims without reservation or royalty,
though Canada and its provinces have long retreated from that position since their first adoption of the U.S. system.
The claim system was adopted in the United States to permit
only small areas to be claimed, enough for a man to work himself,
so as to avoid monopoly. When the matter became of national
concern in the Congress of the United States a century ago, the
method was adopted to encourage settlement of a vast but unoccupied west. None of these bases or reasons exist with respect to mineral
exploitation of the Great Seas. No individual could engage in such
a venture on his own, and huge areas available on a concession basis
would be an absolute necessity. Apparently ignored too by proponents
of the theory is the fact that extent of the claim and its incidents
would need a legal regime for their definition. How does one go
about staking a mineral claim on the bottom of the sea?
The claim-staking concept is really nullified by the rule of international law that claims of dominion by right of discovery are reserved to nations and sovereigns alone. It is a principle which cannot
be asserted by an individual. However, the trick has been tried
and rejected at least by the State Department of the United States.3 '
The obstacle is easily evaded, however, by the method used by
King Henry VII of England almost 500 years ago in his patent to
John Cabot and his sons for discovery rights in new areas of the
world, that is, by commissioning a subject to make discoveries and
effect occupation in the name of his sovereign or nation which, by
the same document, would grant exclusive exploitation rights to
the discoverer. 2
This alternative could succeed only at the cost of returning to
the law of the jungle and the chaos of the Age of Exploration ( 14201620), which first made the rule of Grotius necessary.
Recent technological progress has created a new wrinkle for
the theory. Methods have been developed which, either now or in
the very near future, will permit drilling into the Continental Slope,
31

4 Whiteman 470, 471.

Public Record Office, Treaty Roll 178, Membr. 8, as quoted in Williamson, "The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery Under Henry VII" (1961),
The Hakluyt Society, Series II, Vol. CXX.
32
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at depths far in excess of 200 meters, on a course parallel to the
surface of the sea. Under a claim system then, nation X could drill
right into Y's continental shelf. Some geologists tell us that there
are indications that many now submerged areas show evidence that
they were above sea in recent geologic time and that the geology
of mountain ranges beneath the sea may be like those we know
better. Is the Apex Rule to be revived?
The method I suggest, that is, that the entire extent of the beds
of the seas be divided now, would have the very practical advantage,
in addition to satisfying the legal need, of requiring less backtracking
by the present nations of the world from the positions and commitments they took and made under the Conventions of 1958. By
reducing areas of conflict to regional questions for decision among
only the regional members, general development is not delayed for
resolution of all local conflicts.
It should lead, too, to more signatories than we now have to
the Continental Shelf Convention which now numbers only 37 out
of 123. Can a Convention to which only a little more than a quarter
of all nations have subscribed be considered a universally binding
law of nations? "
In summary then, the present regime, even if the Conventions
of 1958 could be accepted as good and universally binding international law, provides neither a safe nor adequate legal climate to
warrant the investment of the huge sums necessary to recover minerals
from the bed and subsoil of the high seas beyond the first 200 meter
line. That legal state will not, of course, deter the more adventurous.
Except for protests against possible pollution or interference
with navigation, there is no regime even attempting to provide for
the extraction of minerals from the waters of the high seas. Again,
the venturer can look only to himself for protection.
Will the world correct the deficiencies of its law of the sea by
peaceful convention or will it sit immobile until the law of force
imposes solutions? The solution proposed, though simple and straightforward, must be applied, obviously, while the mineral wealth of
the seabeds and subsoils are unknown as to genus, grade, and location.
,3 N.

14, supra.
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